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I. ABSTRACT
Algorithmic trading is well studied in traditional financial
markets. However, it has received less attention in centralized
cryptocurrency exchanges. The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) attributed the 2010 flash crash, one of
the most turbulent periods in the history of financial markets
that saw the Dow Jones Industrial Average lose 9% of its value
within minutes, to automated order “spoofing” algorithms. In
this paper, we build a set of methodologies to characterize and
empirically measure different algorithmic trading strategies in
Binance, a large centralized cryptocurrency exchange, using
a complete data set of historical trades. We find that a sub-
strategy of triangular arbitrage is widespread, where bots
convert between two coins through an intermediary coin, and
obtain a favorable exchange rate compared to the direct one.
We measure the profitability of this strategy, characterize its
risks, and outline two strategies that algorithmic trading bots
use to mitigate their losses. We find that this strategy yields
an exchange ratio that is 0.144%, or 14.4 basis points (bps)
better than the direct exchange ratio. 2.71% of all trades on
Binance are attributable to this strategy.
II. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrency exchanges today handle more than $50b
in daily trade volume [5]. Most of it occurs on centralized
exchanges, which hold assets and settle trades on behalf
of their customers. Traders on these exchanges can convert
different coins at certain exchange ratios, just like traditional
foreign exchange (FX) markets. The ability to convert between
coins creates potential arbitrage opportunities, where traders
can make a profit through a series of conversions. The case
involving three conversions, coin c1 converted to coin c2,
which is then converted to coin c3 and back to c1, is called
triangular arbitrage if the proceeds of the conversions are
greater than the initial quantity. The existence of triangular
arbitrage in foreign exchange markets is well documented [14]
[19] [18] [26]. The characteristics of cryptocurrency exchanges
and their relationship to traditional foreign exchange markets
have been studied as well [17]. However, to the best of our
knowledge, triangular arbitrage has never been studied within
the context of a centralized cryptocurrency exchange.
In this paper, we measure arbitrage activity in Binance, a
centralized cryptocurrency exchanges, by empirically explor-
ing its complete historical trade data. Since different traders
cannot be identified from trade data, we cluster sequences of
consecutive trades that match in their quantities and timing and
attribute them to the same trader. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the firsts to employ a clustering methodology for
identifying triangular arbitrage traders, based on trade-by-trade
data.
We find that triangular arbitrage is rarely accomplished.
Participants predominantly engage in an alternative strategy,
which we call indirect internal conversions, where coin A
is converted to coin B through an intermediary coin x, at a
favorable exchange ratio compared to directly converting A to
B. This activity accounts for 2.71% of the total daily volume,
and offers an exchange ratio that is 14.4 bps better on average.
We believe that the fee structure in cryptocurrency ex-
changes makes it unprofitable for participants to engage in
triangular arbitrage. Instead, participants turn to indirect con-
versions as an efficient way to rebalance their holdings.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Exchanges
An exchange is an organized market where tradable se-
curities, commodities, foreign exchange/cryptocurrencies (or
“coins”) and derivatives are sold and bought (collectively
referred to as instruments). In a centralized exchange, the
deposits and assets of participants are held and settled by
the exchange. In decentralized exchanges (or “DEXes”), a
smart contract (a program executing on a blockchain) or other
form of peer-to-peer network executes exchange functionality.
In DEXes, funds cannot be stolen by the exchange operator,
because their custody and exchange logic is processed and
guaranteed by the smart contract.
In centralized cryptocurrency exchanges, different cryp-
tocurrencies can be exchanged to others, such as Bitcoin and
Ethereum. In addition, some exchanges list ERC20 tokens, or
simply “tokens,” that can also be exchanged to cryptocurren-
cies. Tokens are essentially smart contracts that make use of
the Ethereum blockchain [13].
Participants can place orders on an exchange. An order is
an instruction to buy or sell some traded instrument. These
instructions can be simple or complicated, and can be sent to
either a broker or directly to an exchange via direct market
access. There are some standard instructions for such orders.
For example, a market order is a buy or sell order to be
executed immediately at the current market prices, i.e., buy
at the lowest asking price or sell to the highest bidding price.
Market orders are typically used when certainty of execution
is a priority over the price of execution. A limit order is an
order to buy an instrument at no more than a specific price,
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or to sell at no less than a specific price (called “or better”
for either direction). This gives the trader control over the
price at which the trade is executed; however, the order may
never be executed (“filled”). Limit orders are typically used
when the trader wishes to control price rather than certainty
of execution.
Each instrument traded on an exchange has an order book.
The order book refers to an electronic list of buy and sell
orders for a specific security or financial instrument organized
by price level. An order book lists the number of shares being
bid on or offered at each price point, or market depth [7].
B. Arbitrage
The traditional financial industry has settled on three main
types of quantitative strategies that are sustainable because
they provide real economic value to the market: arbitrage,
market-making and market-taking [8]. In market-taking strate-
gies, traders post both buy and sell orders in the same financial
instrument, hoping to make a profit on the bid-ask spread
[25]. In market-taking strategies, traders engage in longer-
term trading, subject to some rules-based investment method-
ology. Market-taking strategies on centralized cryptocurrency
exchanges have been studied in [23].
Arbitrage and its economic benefits have been well under-
stood for quite some time and documented by academia [27]
[15]. Competitive arbitrageurs on centralized exchanges have
at least one of three advantages.
1) Scale: participants who trade large volumes are often
compensated in the form of kickbacks, rebates, and low
(or zero) trading fees, which provide such participants
the opportunity to make profits in cases where others
with less scale cannot.
2) Speed: the ability to access order book information and
trade faster than others provides an opportunity to gain
from mispricings. For example, triangular arbitrage on
FX products is a major impetus for the Go West and Hi-
bernia microwave telecommunications projects [9] [1],
where multi-million dollar network infrastructure was
developed for the purpose of shaving off milliseconds
in electronic trading latency.
3) Queue position: being able to enter one leg of an
arbitrage trade by placing orders ahead of time, without
crossing the spreads, i.e., placing orders that execute
immediately without being queued in the order book,
significantly reduces fees, which enables profitable com-
pletion of triangular arbitrage trades. Participants are
compensated for the risk of queuing orders in the order
book.
Arbitrage strategies involving multiple centralized cryptocur-
rency exchanges, exploiting different prices of same assets,
have been studied [22] [21] [24] [20].
Arbitrage strategies on decentralized exchanges are executed
by bots who pay high transaction fees and optimize their
network latency to front-run ordinary users’ trades [16].
At time of writing, the vast majority of cryptocurrencies
trading volume (over 99%) is done in centralized exchanges
[5], therefore in this paper, we focus on triangular arbitrage
Figure 1. Number of monthly trades, in millions, executed on Binance, based
on Kaiko’s data set.
in a single centralized cryptocurrency exchange (Binance).
Triangular arbitrage is an arbitrage strategy resulting from
a discrepancy between three coins that occurs when their
exchange rates give rise to a profitable sequence of trades, i.e.,
trades of the form c1 7→ c2 7→ c3 7→ c1, where c1, c2, c3 are
coins, and the ending balance of c1 is greater than the initial
balance. We call c1 the base coin, c2 and c3 intermediary
coins, and the sequence a cycle [10].
To the best of our knowledge, we are the firsts to employ
a clustering methodology for identifying triangular arbitrage
traders.
IV. DATASET
We use historical cryptocurrency trade data and order book
data provided by Kaiko from Nov 9th, 2017 through Aug
6th, 2019 [6]. We conducted our measurements on Binance’s
exchange data, as it is the largest centralized exchange by
daily volume and has the highest number of listed symbols
(the “ticker” of an exchange pair). Kaiko’s data consists of
trade-by-trade data and market depth data for all cryptocur-
rencies and ERC20 tokens traded on Binance. There are
1, 964, 461, 269 trades. Figure 1 shows the monthly number
of trades executed on Binance.
Every coin in Binance is denominated by at least one of
the following coins: BNB (Binance’s native token), Bitcoin,
ALTS (Etheruem, Ripple, Tron) and stable coins. Stable coins
are fiat-pegged cryptocurrencies designed to minimize the
volatility of price fluctuations. We call these coins anchor
coins, as these coins can be directly exchanged to many other
coins and have historically had the greatest market value (in
US dollar terms) [3].
There are 204 different coins and 704 different possible
conversions. We denote such conversions by c1 ⇔ c2, where
c1 and c2 are two different coins. We call c1 ⇔ c2, a pair. For
example, if c1 = BTC and c2 = ETH, then the pair is denoted
BTC ⇔ ETH. Traders can exchange their BTC to ETH (or
vice versa) using this conversion. We write c1 7→ c2 when
considering the side of the c1 holder.
There are 6,534 possible cycles in Binance, i.e., sequences
of the form c1 7→ c2 7→ c3 7→ c1. In 3, 900 of them, one
of c2 and c3 is an anchor. In 2, 634 of them, both c2 and
c3 are anchors. There are no cases where both c2 and c3 are
non-anchors. c1 can be anchor or non-anchor.
Cycle statistics in Binance are summarized in Table I. There
are 1, 982 cycles with a non-anchor coin as the base coin.
Base coin Number of cycles
BTC 986
BNB 818
ALTS 908
Stable coins 1,840
Other coins 1,982
Total 6,534
Table I
NUMBER OF CYCLES IN BINANCE BY BASE COIN. BTC,BNB,ALTS AND
STABLE COINS REPRESENT OVER 92% OF THE TOTAL MARKET VALUE OF
ALL LISTED COINS AND HISTORICALLY HAD LOWER VOLATILITY.
THEREFORE, WE OMIT OTHER CYCLES IN THIS STUDY.
Field Description
id Incremental trade id
exchange Exchange id
symbol Pair symbol
date Time (in epoch) when the trade took place
price Trade price
amount Trade quantity (quoted in base asset)
sell
Binary. If TRUE, then the
holder of c1, swapping to c2,
was a liquidity taker, and c1 is the
base asset in the pair
listed on the exchange
Table II
KAIKO’S TRADE DATA FIELDS.
These cycles have the potential to create arbitrage gains in
non-anchor coins. However, anchor coins represent over 92%
of the total market value of all listed coins and historically
had lower volatility, compared to non-anchor coins. Therefore,
we focus on cycles with anchor base coins. As future work,
we could explore cycles with no-anchor base coins. However,
we note that there is inherent risk in operating in non-anchor
coins, due to volatility.
A. Data Fields
Kaiko’s historical trade data fields are described in Table II.
The granularity of the date field is in ms. Since multiple trades
can execute within the same ms, we use the monotonically
increasing trade ids as a way to order the trades.
Kaiko’s historical order book data is given on a 60-second
basis, that is, for every pair listed, its entire order book is given
in 60 second increments of the date field. Note that the quotes’
depth are not given and need to be reconstructed separately.
The data fields are described in Table III.
Field Description
symbol Pair symbol
date Time (in epoch) when the order was placed
type Bid or ask
amount Order quantity (quoted in base asset)
Table III
KAIKO’S ORDER BOOK DATA FIELDS.
B. Data Limitations
Kaiko’s order book data is given on a 60-second interval
basis and Binance’s API does not provide historical order-book
data [4]. Complete order book data could reveal all arbitrage
opportunities, not just the ones executed with actual trades,
as it would accurately paint the traders’ view of the market
at any point in time. When merging Kaiko’s historical trade
data with its order book, only about 5% of the trade data has
matching order book data available within a 100ms interval.
(During our measurements, we used smaller time intervals than
100ms.) For profitability measurements, about 0.5% of the
time, we were able to use the order book’s bid/ask directly.
For the remainder, we approximated the bid/ask price with the
volume-weighted average price of that time interval, based on
the trade data. In addition, Kaiko does not include trade fees
or historical fee schedules, so we had to reconstruct Binance’s
historical fee time series.
C. Binance Trading Fees
An important data point for our analysis are the trading fees
collected by Binance [2]. For every trade executed, Binance
collects a fee from the proceeds of the trade. The fees are
collected either in the currency of the proceeds or in Binance’s
native ERC20 token, BNB, depending on the trader’s BNB
balance. If the trader has enough BNB balance, Binance will
calculate the conversion rate between the proceeds and BNB,
and withdraw the fees from the BNB balance. In general,
Binance rewards participants who trade large volumes by
charging them a lower fee. In addition, for high-volume
traders, Binance distinguishes between liquidity-taking trades,
i.e., market order trades or limit order trades that were matched
immediately at the best bid/ask level, and market-making
trades, which are trades that were placed somewhere in the or-
der book but were not executed immediately. Binance charges
less fees for market-making trades, as they wish to encourage
participants to “fill up” the order book, thereby narrowing
the bid/ask spread and increasing liqudity. This is a common
practice; however, in traditional financial exchanges, market-
makers pay zero or even negative fees (rebates, kickbacks).
We assume that arbitrageurs are operating at the lowest
fee level. To track Binance’s fee schedule, we used the
Wayback Machine [12], a digital archive of the World Wide
Web, to view Binance’s fee web page historically. In our
analysis time span, Binance’s fee web page changed 46 times.
However, the lowest fee level remained constant at 1.2bps for
makers and 2.4bps for takers.
V. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe our methodology for discovering
triangular arbitrage trade sequences in Binance by examining
the trade data. During our analysis, we discovered that a
sub-strategy of triangular arbitrage, involving only the first
two conversions, is widely deployed. We refined our original
methodology to identify such conversions. These conversions
exhibit some risks, one of them is the scenario where multiple
traders compete for the same intermediary coin, potentially
harming laggards’ profitability. We identify these risks and
outline a methodology for clustering competing events. Lastly,
we observe different strategies traders take to mitigate this risk
and describe a methodology to detect it.
A. Discovering Triangular Arbitrage Trading Sequences
To discern triangular arbitrage trading sequences, we design
a methodology to identify likely arbitrage trading sequences.
We look for trading sequences of the form c1 7→ c2 7→
c3 7→ c1, where c1 is an anchor coin (BTC, BNB, ALTS,
Stable coins). Arbitrageurs start with some quantity Q1 of c1,
exchange it to c2 at price p12, resulting in Q2 units of c2. In
practice, Binance deducts the fee upon conversion, therefore
Q2 will be slightly lower than the conversion price. Next, Q2
units of c2 are converted to c3, resulting in Q3 units, minus
fees. Lastly, Q3 units of c3 are converted back to c1, minus
fees, resulting in Q′1 units of c1. If Q
′
1 > Q1, then the arbitrage
sequence is profitable.
To successfully profit from this opportunity, arbitrageurs
need to execute 3 trades, c1 7→ c2, c2 7→ c3 and c3 7→ c1. First,
an arbitrageur needs to calculate the initial quantity Q1 of c1,
such that during conversions, fee payments and other trading
constraints will leave no or minimal residue in the intermediary
coins. Second, since Binance does not support batch trading,
i.e., grouping multiple orders in a single request, arbitrageurs
need to ensure correct timing of their trades. For example,
if the order c2 7→ c3 arrives before c1 7→ c2, then it will
fail as the arbitrageur does not hold c2 yet. Furthermore, the
arbitrageur competes with other arbitrageurs for these trades,
so speed is an important factor.
In order to identify triangular arbitrage sequences, we first
need to ensure that the same quantity is flowing through dif-
ferent coins, ending at the base coin. Binance quotes quantities
based on how the pair is listed. Different pairs have different
quantity/price restrictions, namely, minimum, maximum and
increment size. Since quantities and prices change in discrete
steps, a small quantity might not be converted, leaving a
residue. These small residues need to be accounted for when
identifying trades with equal quantities. While these residues
have a (small) value, in practice, they cannot be converted
immediately to anchor coins, due to minimum size restric-
tions. As residue accumulates beyond the exchange threshold,
arbitrageurs can convert it back to anchor coins. We found
that less than 0.01% of the time, the profitability was decided
by the residue. Therefore, in our detection process we ignore
the residue value. To illustrate coin exchanges, we follow an
actual trade example from Binance.
1) BTC⇔ETH Exchange Example: Consider the conver-
sion between BTC and ETH. It is listed as ETH/BTC in
Binance. ETH is called base asset and BTC is called the quote
asset. The quantity is always given in base asset terms. This
pair has a 0.001 minimum quantity (base asset), 100, 000 max-
imum quantity, 0.001 quantity increments, 0.000001 minimum
price (quote asset), 100, 000 maximum price and 10−6 price
increments. At the time of writing, the last trade of ETH/BTC
was executed at a price of 0.018876 and quantity 0.153. The
“sell” flag was on, meaning that the holder of ETH was the
one to initiate the trade and met the buyer at the buyer’s bid
price. Assume both participants are at the cheapest fee level,
currently at 2.4bps for takers and 1.2bps for makers.
From the ETH holder’s perspective: Since ETH is the
base asset and the “sell” flag is on, this means the ETH
Binance listing Matching condition
c2/c3, c1/c2 q12p12 − q23 = fee + residue
c2/c3, c2/c1 q12 − q23 = fee + residue
c3/c2, c1/c2 q12p12 − q23p23 = fee + residue
c3/c2, c2/c1 q12 − q23p23 = fee + residue
Table IV
MATCHING EQUAL QUANTITIES IN CONVERSIONS WITH COMMON COIN.
qij AND pij ARE THE QUANTITIES AND PRICES QUOTED IN THE TRADE
DATA.
holder initiated the trade and met the buyer at the buyer’s
bid price, therefore paying a liquidity taking fee of 2.4bps.
The holder exchanged 0.153 units of his ETH at a price of
0.018876 BTC per 1 ETH. This means the holder ended with
0.153 · 0.018876 · 0.99976 = 0.002887334873 units of BTC.
Note that if 0.002887334873 BTC are to be exchanged for
some other coin, only 0.00288733 could be converted, leaving
0.000000004873 BTC residue.
From the BTC holder’s perspective: Since BTC is the quote
asset and the “sell” flag is on, this means the BTC holder
provided the liquidity for the trade and his price was met by
the seller, thus paying a liquidity making fee of 1.2bps. The
BTC holder exchanged 0.153 · 0.018876 = 0.002888028 units
of BTC at a price of 0.018876 BTC per 1 ETH, while paying
1.2bps fee, resulting in (0.002888028/0.018876) · 0.99988 =
0.15298164 ETH.
From Binance’s perspective: They collect 2.4bps of the BTC
proceeds from the ETH holder, i.e., 0.00024 · 0.002888028 ≈
6.93 · 10−7 units of BTC. If the ETH holder also holds BNB,
then this amount is actually converted to BNB terms (using
an average of recent exchange ratios between BTC and BNB),
and deducted from the BNB balance. If the ETH holder does
not own BNB, then 6.93 · 10−7 BTC are deducted from the
proceeds. In addition, Binance also collect 1.2bps of the ETH
proceeds from the BTC holder, i.e., 0.153 · 0.00012 ≈ 18.36 ·
10−6 units of ETH. If the BTC holder also holds BNB, this
amount is collected in BNB terms as well. Note that if the
seller/buyer did not hold BNB, the fee would have been higher.
In our analysis, we assumed arbitrageurs operate at the lowest
fee level.
2) Identifying Equal Quantities in Triangular Arbitrage
Sequences: We identify sequences of trades, c1 7→ c2 7→ c3 7→
c1, where the same quantity is passed. The quantity is quoted
in the base asset and depends on whether c1/c2 or c2/c1 is
listed, whether c2/c3 or c3/c2 is listed and whether c1/c3 or
c3/c1 is listed. When matching quantities between trades of
two pairs, having a common coin, c1 7→ c2 and c2 7→ c3, we
translate the quantities to the common coin’s terms, c2, and
check if they are equal, up to fees and residue resulting from
the trade. In Table IV, we describe the translation process,
based on different listing scenarios in Binance.
3) Identifying Trade Latency in Triangular Arbitrage Se-
quences: When a triangular arbitrage opportunity presents
itself, arbitrageurs compete amongst each other to be the first
to execute the trade sequences. There are three trades to be
executed, c1 7→ c2, c2 7→ c3 and c3 7→ c1. Since Binance
does not support batch trading, an arbitrageur will have to
send three limit orders with prices p12, p23, p31 and quantities
q12, q23, q31. These quantities are equal in the conversion
process, in the sense explained previously and the prices match
the prices quoted in the order book. To ensure that trades
are received in their original order, the arbitrageur will take
into account network latency and wait a small amount of time
between sending consecutive orders. Analysis of the trade data
suggests that the average latency between consecutive trades
is 20 ms with a standard deviation of 15 ms. Around 95%
of trades with matching quantities are executed within 10ms-
30ms of each other. Therefore, clustering trades using longer
latency does not have material impact on the number of trades
identified. We find that using ∆t ≈ 50ms as an approximation
for arbitrage latency between consecutive trades maximizes
precision and minimizes recall.
We found that less than 0.01% of triangular arbitrage
sequences contain a liquidity-making trade. We believe this
behavior is caused by Binance’s fee model, which charges
traders a commission even for liquidity making trades. If
traders used liquidity-making orders, they would need to pay
the fee in case they were filled. At that point, it is not
guaranteed that an arbitrage opportunity will exist, while the
fee is already paid and exposure to what is mostly an illiquid
coin is already established. To further enhance our precision,
we require arbitrage trade sequences to be all liquidity-taking.
Furthermore, we found a surprisingly low number of trian-
gular arbitrage trades, 1,381,928 in total, accounting for 0.24%
of total number of trades. However, in the course of clustering
triangular arbitrage trades, we witnessed a much larger number
of partial arbitrage sequences, 20,892,825, or 2.71% of total
trades, where traders executed the first two trades, c1 7→ c2
and c2 7→ c3, but did not execute the third trade, c3 7→ c1.
Executing the first two trades effectively converts c1 to c3
at an exchange ratio of p12 · p23, minus fees and residue.
Interestingly, 95% of the time these trades resulted in an
exchange ratio that was favorable to the exchange ratio of
the direct trade c1 7→ c3. We call this trading strategy indirect
internal conversions and explain below in more details what
is means to have a “favorable” rate.
We refine our methodology to identify indirect internal
conversions and study the root cause of unprofitable instances.
We elaborate on the risks associated with this trading strategy
in the discussion section.
B. Discovering Indirect Internal Conversion Attempts
We refined our original methodology for discovering trian-
gular arbitrage sequences by relaxing the constraint for the
third trade to be executed. We identify equal quantities in
the first two trades in the same way as before. To determine
the trade latency, we empirically explored different time con-
straints. 93% of trades with equal quantities have a latency
between 10ms and 100ms. Latency lower than 10ms gives
poor recall, with less than 5% of total attempts. Latency greater
than 100ms only accounts for 2% of all attempts. The average
latency is 22ms with a standard deviation of 15ms. We find
that, as before, ∆t ≈ 50ms is an approximation that likely
provides both high precision and recall for identifying indirect
conversion trading sequences. However, we lack ground truth
to definitively evaluate this part of our methodology.
1) Determining Profitability of Internal Conversions: The
first two trades of a triangular arbitrage sequence, c1 7→ c2 7→
c3 7→ c1 are c1 7→ c2 and c2 7→ c3. Executing these two
trades gives an indirect exchange ratio between c1 and c3. If
this exchange ratio, net of fees and residue, is greater than
the exchange ratio of c1 7→ c3, then this conversion offers
a favorable exchange ratio to the direct one. We call such
favorable conversions indirect internal conversions. Since the
exchange ratio between c1 and c3 fluctuates, it is important to
define the time it is taken. We wish to approximate the trader’s
view of the market upon executing the internal conversion.
Therefore, we take the exchange ratio at a short period of time
prior to the first trade’s execution time. As discussed above,
50ms is a good delay approximation for the trader’s view.
Kaiko’s order book data is given on a 60-second basis, so it is
unlikely that this 50ms time window falls within Kaiko’s data
intervals. To approximate the order book’s best bid/ask price at
the time, we take the volume weighted average price (VWAP)
[11] of c1 7→ c3, over the period of 50ms, prior to the execution
time of the first trade. These trades tell us the best bid/ask level
at that time, and taking an average, weighted by volume, is a
good approximation of the trader’s view of the order book.
However, it is possible that within that time period, other
participants posted bids and asks and then cancelled them,
giving the trader a completely different view of c1 7→ c3. In
our analysis, we assume that this did not occur. If there were
no trades during that period and order book data is unavailable,
we cannot determine if the conversion is profitable and did not
include such conversions in our profitability analysis.
We found 26, 603, 038 indirect conversions, which is 2.71%
of the total number of trades. 95% of the indirect conversions
resulted in a favorable exchange ratio. We hypothesized that
unprofitable conversions occur when multiple traders obtain
the same intermediary coin c2, and simultaneously attempt to
convert it to c3. For example, one trader is looking to convert
c1 7→ c2 7→ c3 for a favorable exchange ratio to c1 7→ c3, and a
second trader is looking to convert y 7→ c2 7→ c3 at a favorable
exchange ratio to y 7→ c3 (y could be the same coin as c1).
When both traders obtain c2, there could be a scenario where
only one trader is able to convert c2 to c3 at the best bid/ask
level. This happens when the first one to execute c2 7→ c3
consumes the entire quantity of the best bid/ask and causes
the order book to change. The laggard in this case engages in
a loss mitigating strategy. One option is to convert c2 to c3
at a worse exchange ratio than originally intended, potentially
resulting in a conversion that is worse than the direct one.
Another option is to convert c2 to several other coins, with
the goal of minimizing the potential losses from unfavorable
exchange ratios. We call the former strategy a full-exit strategy
and the latter partial-exit strategy.
To corroborate our hypothesis with the trade data, we refine
our methodology to cluster competing conversions and identify
loss-mitigating exit strategies.
C. Clustering Competing Indirect Internal Conversion At-
tempts
Using our methodology to discover indirect conversions, we
identified conversions that were initiated around the same time
and had an overlapping intermediary coin. This is because
competing conversions try to complete the same second trade.
Therefore, for a given second trade c2 7→ c3, we look at
indirect conversions attempts of the form x 7→ c2 7→ c3 that
started within 100ms of each other.
Every cluster of competing conversions can have winning
conversions, i.e., indirect conversions that were completed at
a favorable rate to the direct rate and losing conversions,
conversions that completed at an unfavorable rate to the direct
rate.
Losing conversions can have many causes, such as mistim-
ing or an inaccurate view of the order book. We believe that
one of those reasons is that traders who successfully completed
the first trade, and failed to complete the second trade, are
unloading their c2 coin at an unfavorable rate to avoid having
directional exposure to c2.
1) Identifying Loss-Mitigating Trading Strategies: For los-
ing conversions, we wanted to see if the loss was the result of
a competing winning conversion that utilized all the capacity
of c2 7→ c3. Determining whether a conversion utilized all
capacity is impossible without knowing the order book at
that time. However, we can approximate it by observing the
next trade of c2 7→ c3. Since we have the trade id, which is
monotonically increasing with the trades, we can tell whether
the next trade of c2 7→ c3 was completed at the same price or
not. If it was not completed at the same price, it is likely that
the previous trade used up the capacity of the previous level.
This is only a heuristic, as traders can post and cancel orders
at any time.
Loss-mitigating conversions are losing conversions where a
winning conversion in the same cluster used up the interme-
diary’s coin capacity.
By analyzing the trade data, we found that 17.7% of all
losing conversions corresponded to loss-mitigating traders.
We identified two sub-strategies of loss-mitigating traders.
2) Full-Exit Loss Mitigating Strategy: These are conver-
sions that converted an equal quantity Q1 from x 7→ c2 and
c2 7→ c3, i.e., these are traders who converted all their c2 into
one coin.
3) Partial-Exit Loss Mitigating Strategy: These are con-
versions that converted a quantity Q1 from x 7→ c2 at price
p12, but converted a lower quantity Q2 < Q1 from c2 7→ c3,
i.e., these are traders who unloaded some, but not all of their
c2 into one coin. This strategy can be attributed to traders
solving the following minimization problem: Find a set of k
coins {d1, d2, . . . dk} having exchange ratios {p1, p2, . . . pk},
and a set of k quantities {q1, q2, . . . qk}, where
∑k
j=1 qj = Q1
such that the following loss function is minimized:
Loss =
k∑
j=1
qj
(
p13
p12pj
)
where p13 is the direct exchange ratio of x 7→ c3. To detect
partial exits, we iterate over all different combinations of trades
from c2 7→ c3 having quantities less than Q1, such that they
sum exactly to Q1, up to fees and residue.
We found that 85% of loss-mitigating strategies are partial
exits and 15% are full exits. It also turns out that solving a loss
minimization problems is effective, as the average partial-exit
loss is 21bps while the full-exit average loss is 25bps.
VI. RESULTS
A. Volume
We found 26, 603, 038 indirect conversions, which is 2.71%
of total trades. We found 1, 381, 928 triangular arbitrage
sequences, accounting for 0.24% of total trades.
The time series of the number of favorable indirect conver-
sion attempts as a percentage of number of direct conversions,
on a daily basis, is shown in Figure 2. The number of favorable
indirect conversion attempts, on a daily basis, in shown in
Figure 3. The number of triangular arbitrage attempts, on a
daily basis, in shown in Figure 4.
Figure 2. Percentage of daily volume of direct conversions trades that is also
done indirectly. Typically, 1%−3% of the daily volume of a direct conversion
pair is also executed via indirect conversion sequences.
Figure 3. Daily number of indirect conversion attempts. From October 2017
- October 2018, the number of indirect conversions has been trending down
and since October 2018 has been trending up.
B. Latency
We found that indirect conversion sequences have, on
average, 21.43ms of delay between the first trade and the
second, with a standard deviation of 11.04ms. 78.94% have
a latency of 30ms or less. Triangular arbitrage sequences are
faster than indirect conversions. This could be an indication
that this space is more competitive. We found that triangular
Figure 4. Daily number of triangular arbitrage attempts. From October 2017
- April 2019, the number of triangular arbitrage attempts has been trending
down and since April 2019 has been trending up, with a sharp spike in July
2019
arbitrage sequences have, on average, 20.7ms of delay between
consecutive trades, with a standard deviation of 11.04ms.
85.43% have a latency of 30ms or less. The latency statistics
of triangular arbitrage sequences and indirect conversions are
shown in Table V. The latency distribution, in ms, of indirect
Type Metric Value
Triangular Arbitrage Latency Average 20.7ms
Triangular Arbitrage Latency Stdev 11.04ms
Triangular Arbitrage % Below 30ms 85.43%
Indirect Conversion Latency Average 21.43ms
Indirect Conversion Latency Stdev 13.7ms
Indirect Conversion % Below 30ms 78.94%
Table V
LATENCY STATISTICS FOR TRIANGULAR ARBITRAGE AND INDIRECT
CONVERSIONS. THE TRIANGULAR ARBITRAGE STRATEGY EXHIBITS
LOWER LATENCY THAN INDIRECT CONVERSIONS, POSSIBLY A SIGN THAT
THIS STRATEGY IS MORE COMPETITIVE
conversions and triangular arbitrage is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Left: Latency distribution, in ms, of indirect conversion trade
sequences. Right: Latency distribution, in ms, of triangular arbitrage trade
sequences. Indirect conversion trades exhibit higher latency with a fatter tail,
indicating that triangular arbitrage is more competitive.
C. Profitability
We calculate the equal-weighted return and the return on
capital for triangular arbitrage trades and indirect conversions.
The equal-weighted return is the average of returns. The return
on capital is the arithmetic average of returns, weighted by
quantity of base coin committed to the trade, i.e., larger trades
receive higher weight.
Indirect conversion attempts were profitable 93.92% of the
time with an equal-weighted net return of 11.8bps. The return
on capital for indirect conversions is 22% greater, at 14.4bps,
which means that traders efficiently commit more coins to
more profitable opportunities.
Triangular arbitrage trades were profitable 94.97% of the
time with an equal-weighted net return of 9.3bps. The return
on capital for triangular arbitrage sequences is 5% greater, at
9.8bps, which is slightly higher than the equal-weighted return,
but not significantly.
It appears that triangular arbitrage traders are unable to sig-
nificantly allocate more coins to more profitable opportunities.
One potential explanation is that the space is more crowded,
or “arb-ed out,” than the indirect conversions strategy.
D. Loss-Mitigating Strategies
We saw 1, 617, 464 instances of indirect conversion com-
pleted at an unfavorable rate compared to the direct rate, or
6.08% of the total number of indirect conversions. 17.7% of
such conversions were loss-mitigating trades, triggered by a
competing indirect conversion that used all the intermediary
coin’s capacity. When this happened, there were 1.06 compet-
ing conversions on average. The highest number of competing
conversions we saw in one cluster was 5.
In 15% of such cases, the entire base quantity was unloaded
into another coin, i.e., they were full exits. The return on
capital for the full exit strategy was −27.4bps. 85% of the
time, the base coin quantity was unloaded to several other
coins, i.e., they were partial exits. On average, the number
of coins used to exit was 2.7, and the return on capital
was −23.8bps. Intuitively, this shows that solving a loss
minimization problem mitigates losses by 3.6bps compared
to a full exit. Note, however, that a full exit could potentially
be the solution to the minimization problem as well.
VII. DISCUSSION
The existence of triangular arbitrage in traditional foreign
exchange markets is well documented and studied in academia.
In centralized cryptocurrency exchanges such as Binance,
triangular arbitrage happens at a small scale. However, we
found that a different strategy is taking place, which converts
two coins through an intermediary coin, at a favorable rate
to the direct conversion rate. This strategy comes with a
risk, however, that multiple competing conversions occur at
the same time, preventing slower ones from completing their
conversions. We saw that when this happens, traders engage
in a loss-mitigating strategy. We believe that the rationale for
this strategy stems from Binance’s fee structure, where there
is a fee for market-making, thus creating frictions for the
triangular arbitrage strategy. We believe arbitrageurs adapted
to the fee structure by executing the indirect conversions
strategy. While triangular arbitrage increases the arbitrageur’s
holding in the base asset, indirect conversions simply provide
a more favorable ratio to the direct one. Participants who
already have a stake in the cryptocurrency ecosystem and wish
to rebalance their portfolio might choose to engage in this
strategy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We found that 0.24% of daily trades on Binance can be
attributed to triangular arbitrage trades. We found that a
different strategy is 11 times more prevalent, at 2.71% of
daily trades, which involves exchanging coins through an
intermediary coin at a favorable rate to the direct exchange
rate. We designed a methodology to measure such events and
discovered that 93.92% of the time the rate obtained from
these conversions is 14.4bps better than the direct one. When
it is not, 17.7% of the time traders engage in loss-mitigating
strategies, and we identified two of them.
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IX. APPENDIX
In this appendix, we define notations that are specific to
the market microstructure of Binance and formally define
triangular arbitrage and indirect conversions.
Let P be the set of all pairs x/y traded on Binance. Every
pair facilitates two conversions; from x to y and from y to x,
denoted by (x 7→ y) and (y 7→ x), respectively.
Definition IX.1. (exchange ratio) Let ψij be the proceeds of
converting 1 unit of coin ci to cj . We call ψij the exchange
ratio and it is given by
ψij =

1
pask
cj/ci
if cj/ci ∈ P
pbidci/cj if ci/cj ∈ P
Definition IX.2. (pair capacity) Denote ηij the maximum
quantity ci that can be converted to cj . We call ηij the capacity
of (ci 7→ cj) and it is given by
ηij =
{
paskcj/ciq
ask
cj/ci
if cj/ci ∈ P
qbidci/cj if ci/cj ∈ P
Definition IX.3. (bid-ask spread) We write
∆ij =
{
paskcj/ci − pbidcj/ci if cj/ci ∈ P
paskci/cj − pbidci/cj if ci/cj ∈ P
the bid ask spread of pair (ci 7→ cj)
Definition IX.4. (trade quantity) suppose we wish to convert
q units of ci to cj . The trade quantity passed to the exchange
as a parameter is denoted T (q) and is given by
Tij(q) =

q
pask
cj/ci
if cj/ci ∈ P
q if ci/cj ∈ P
Definition IX.5. (minimum trade lot size) Let mij be the
minimum amount of ci that must be converted to cj in
(ci 7→ cj), i.e., when converting q units of ci to cj , mij ≤ q
Definition IX.6. (high-level parameters) the h-th order book
exchange ratio and capacity are denoted ψhij and η
h
ij , respec-
tively.
Definition IX.7. (minimum price increment) Denote dxij the
the minimum order book price increments of (ci 7→ cj).
Remark. It holds that dxij = dxji.
In practice, when converting q units of ci to cj , the trade
quantity passed to the exchange as a parameter has to be a
multiple of dxij , therefore only
⌊
T (q)
dxij
⌋
dxij units are passed.
Denote bxcy :=
⌊
x
y
⌋
y the rounding operation of x to the
nearest multiple of y.
Definition IX.8. (residuals) Let rij(q) be the quantity of ci
left when converting q units of ci to cj . We write
rij(q) =
{(
T (q)− bT (q)cdxij
)
paskcj/ci if cj/ci ∈ P
T (q)− bT (q)cdxij if ci/cj ∈ P
Therefore, converting x units of ci yields ψij [x− rij(x)]
units of cj and rij(x) residual units of ci
A. Cycle Arbitrage
The set of pairs C = {(c1 7→ c2), (c2 7→ c3), . . . , (cn 7→
cn+1)} is called a cycle, if cn+1 = c1 and cj 6∈ {c1, . . . cj−1}
for 1 < j ≤ n. In the context of cycles, we use the shortened
notation ψi, ηi, dxi, ri when referring to pairs of the form
(ci 7→ ci+1). A cycle with n = 3 is called a triangular
sequence.
Definition IX.9. The capacity of cycle C = {(c1 7→
c2), . . . , (cn 7→ cn+1)} is the maximum quantity of c1 that
can be converted through its pairs.
The capacity of a cycle is given by
Q = min
1≤i≤n
ηi
(
i−1∏
k=1
ψk
)−1 (1)
The balance of ci, denoted qi, is given by the recurrence
relation
q1 = Q− r1(Q)
qi+1 = ψi [qi − ri(qi)] , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Remark. ri
(
x− ri(x)
)
= 0
B. Binance Fee Structure
The fees paid on (ci 7→ ci+1) are fqi+1bi+1 where f =
5 · 10−4 and bi+1 is the last traded price of (ci+1 7→ BNB)
bi =
{
1
pBNB/ci
if BNB/ci ∈ P
pci/BNB if ci/BNB ∈ P
The gain/loss in c1 terms is given by
G = (qn+1 − q1) +
n∑
i=1
ri(qi)ψi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
residuals c1 value
− f
n∑
i=1
qi+1bi+1ψB1︸ ︷︷ ︸
fees c1 value
(2)
Note that G is a function of {ψ21, . . . , ψn1, ψB1, b2, . . . , bn+1}
as well as ψ1, . . . ψn.
Definition IX.10. a cycle is called an arbitrage free cycle if
G ≤ 0
Definition IX.11. a cycle is called an open cycle if G > 0
Remark. One can argue that there are additional costs for
converting the residuals to c1 and purchasing BNB tokens
ahead of time to be able to pay fees, which are not accounted
for in (2). However, this can be done in infrequent bulk trades.
We make the assumption that small directional exposure to
BNB and residuals is negligible compared to the accumulated
gains over a period of time.
Remark 1. If we assume zero residuals, i.e., ∀i : ri = 0, then
qi+1 = Q
∏i−1
j=1 ψj and (2) reduces to G = Q (
∏n
i=1 ψi − 1)−
f
∑n
i=1Q
(∏i
j=1 ψj
)
bi+1ψB1
C. Indirect Internal Conversions
The set of pairs V = {(c1 7→ c2), (c2 7→ c3), . . . , (cn 7→
cn+1)} is called a conversion if cj 6∈ {c1, . . . cj−1} for 1 <
j ≤ n + 1. In the context of conversions, we use notation
ψi, ηi, dxi, ri when referring to pairs of the form (ci 7→ ci+1).
When the intermediate pairs are clear, we use the shortened
notation c1
V cn+1
Definition IX.12. The capacity of conversion V = {(c1 7→
c2), . . . , (cn 7→ cn+1)} is the maximum quantity of c1 that
can be converted through its pairs and is defined similarly to
the capacity of a cycle.
Definition IX.13. (conversion proceeds) Let c1
V cn+1 be a
conversion from c1 to cn+1 with capacity Q. The conversion
proceeds of q ≤ Q units of c1 is the quantity of cn+1 that
results from converting through the pairs of V , accounting for
residuals and fees, i.e.,
Pr(q, V ) = qn+1 +
n∑
i=1
ri(qi)ψi(n+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
residuals cn+1 value
− f
n∑
i=1
qi+1bi+1ψB(n+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
fees cn+1 value
Definition IX.14. (profitable conversions) Let x V1 y and
x
V2 y be two conversions from x to y, with capacities
Q1 and Q2, respectively. Let Q = min{Q1, Q2}. We say
that V1 is a profitable conversion w.r.t. V2 if the proceeds of
conversion V1 are greater than the proceeds of conversion V2,
i.e., Pr(Q,V1) > Pr(Q,V2)
D. Binance Order Types
Binance supports the following order types:
1) LIMIT - an order to buy/sell a pair at a specified price
and can only be executed at that price (or better). Not
guaranteed to execute
2) MARKET - an order to buy/sell a pair at the best current
market price, i.e., lowest ask or highest bid.
3) STOP_LOSS_LIMIT - an order to buy (sell) a pair,
once its price exceeds (drops below) the specified price.
In contrast to a LIMIT order, the price should be above
(below) the lowest ask (highest bid). The execution price
is guaranteed to be the specified price.
4) STOP_LOSS - same as STOP_LOSS_LIMIT, but when
the price threshold is breached, a MARKET order is
executed and the execution price is not guaranteed.
5) TAKE_PROFIT_LIMIT - equivalent to a LIMIT order
6) TAKE_PROFIT - automatically places a MARKET order
when the specified price level is met
7) LIMIT_MAKER - LIMIT orders that will be rejected if
they would immediately match and trade as a taker.
8) ICEBERG - an order used for large quantities as it
automatically breaks down to multiple LIMIT orders
with different prices. The goal is to hide the actual order
quantity and prevent trend-followers from unfavorably
moving the price.
